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The Debtor-Patient
IN SEARCH OF NON-DEBT-BASED ALTERNATIVES'
Melissa B. Jacoby'
No one enters my house if he does not have with him
the money to pay me, unless he is paying me
monthly, in advance.
Dr. Samuel Hahnemann,
Letter to Dr. Karl Julius
Aegidi, early 1800s'
I. INTRODUCTION
Samuel Hahnemann, founder of homeopathy, was both
savvy and prescient. Today, patients and providers routinely
enter debtor-creditor relationships, although the roles are
reversed: whereas Dr. Hahnemann owed his patients services
for which they had pre-paid, patients today more often are
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debtors as a result of seeking health care.' Accordingly,
patients and providers assume legal rights and duties defined
by a system of commercial debtor-creditor laws that generally
cannot and do not account for the health-related origin of the
debt or its implications for the debtor's health.
Part II of this Article explains the entanglement
between health care and the debtor-creditor system. Part III
argues that, particularly from the patient's perspective, debt
and bankruptcy have disadvantages as methods of financing
health care on either a stand-alone or supplemental basis.
Finally, Part IV explores several alternatives for reducing
dependency on debt and bankruptcy in the health care
environment, as well as the respective limitations of each
approach.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF MEDICAL-RELATED DEBT AND
BANKRUPTCY TO THE GENERAL POPULATION
A significant portion of the population has filed for
bankruptcy.' Since 1992, annual national case filings have
increased by sixty-one percent.' The court system reported 1.5
million non-business bankruptcy petitions for calendar year
2002,' and a record-breaking beginning to calendar year 2003.'
Although not every petition represents a new filer - some
individuals have filed more than once - many filings represent
more than one person. Taking that into account, more than 3.7
million individuals may have been in bankrupt households in
calendar year 2001 alone.7
2 See generally Rhonda L. Rundle, Pay-As-You-Go M.D.: The Doctor Is In,
But Insurance Is Out, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2003, at Al.
3 ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP:
WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 6 (2003).
4 News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Need for
Additional Bankruptcy Judges at a Critical Level (May 22, 2003), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ PressReleases/bkjud503.pdf.
5 News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Record Breaking
Bankruptcy Filings Reported in Calendar Year 2002 (Feb. 14, 2003) (reporting
1,539,111 non-business filings in calendar year 2002, and 1,577,651 filings overall),
available at http'//www.uscourts.gov/ Press-Releases/cy02.pdf.
6 News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy
Filings Continue to Increase: Records Broken for Total Filings and Non-Business
Filings (May 15, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press-Releases/
303bk.pdf. The beginning of CY 2003 is the second period of FY 2003, which is how the
statistics are reported.
Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1010 (2002);
see also Teresa A. Sullivan, Deborah Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Young, Old, and In
Between: Who Files For Bankruptcy?, NORTON BANER. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2001, at 1-2.
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In addition to the growing number of filers,' debt is a
significant part of the financial picture for many others who
have not filed, particularly because debt pervades even lower-
income households Economists Amanda E. Dawsey and
Lawrence M. Ausubel caution that focusing exclusively on
bankruptcy filers runs the risk of ignoring the "informally
bankrupt" who may be just as numerous as actual bankruptcy
filers, if not more so.'" Ignoring the existence of the informally
bankrupt may disregard "half or more of the households in a
state of financial collapse, a mammoth underestimation given
the soaring bankruptcy rate."" Studying bankruptcy filers, who
have general demographic similarities to the overall
population," provides a window into a larger number of
financially distressed households.
8 Bankruptcy can be initiated by creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2000), but
nearly all bankruptcy cases are initiated by debtors themselves under 11 U.S.C. § 301,
302 (2000).
9 Arthur B. Kennickell, Martha Starr-McCluer & Brian J. Surette, Recent
Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,
86 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (2000) (discussing percentage of income used for debt repayment
among low-income households), available at http:/Iwww.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin2000/0100lead.pdf; Joanna Stavins, Credit Card Borrowing, Delinquency, and
Personal Bankruptcy, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July/Aug. 2000, at 18 (reporting
disproportionate increase in credit card use and indebtedness among lower-income
households); Arthur B. Kennickell, Martha Starr-McCluer & Annika E. Sunden,
Family Finances in the United States: Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, 83 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 21 (1997), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1997/0197lead.pdf (discussing increase in
credit card usage among low-income households).
'0 See, e.g., AMANDA E. DAWSEY & LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL, INFORMAL
BANKRUPTCY (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-
papers/informal-bankruptcy.pdf. For a similar dynamic in business bankruptcy, see
Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy
System, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 311 (1982) (discussing businesses closing their doors without
bankruptcy).
" See, e.g., DAWSEY & AUSUBEL, supra note 10. See also Michelle J. White,
Why it Pays To File For Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S.
Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal For Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 706 &
n.81 (1998) (reporting that the "proportion of households that would benefit financially
from bankruptcy is much higher than the proportion that actually file"); Michelle J.
White, Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 205 (1998) (same).
" See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000) [hereinafter
SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS]; TERESA A. SULLIVAN,
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989) [hereinafter SULLIVAN,
WARREN & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE]. Financially, the formally bankrupt
population is different from the overall population. For example, the median income of
bankruptcy filers' households around the time they file (most estimates under $30,000)
is low relative to the general U.S. population. Compare CARMEN DENAVAS-WALL &
ROBERT W. CLEVELAND, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES:
20041
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Likewise, the subset of medical-related bankruptcy
filers illuminates health-related financial trouble more
generally. Several recently published studies have found that
between one third to more than half of bankruptcy filers owed
debts to medical providers at the time of filing.'3 Although some
bear modest medical debts, Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn
found a small but notable portion with large medical debts:
Among those with medical debt (over half of their sample),
about eleven percent reported five thousand dollars or more in
medical debt, which is a significant amount relative to the
mean and median incomes of the sample ($28,248 and $24,336,
respectively). 4 Among a random sampling of clients who sought
assistance with bankruptcy filings from the Legal Aid Society
of Greater Cincinnati in 2000-2001, the average medical debt
was five thousand dollars." To accurately capture medical-
related indebtedness, one should also consider medical debt
paid off prior to the bankruptcy filing and debt financed with
third-party credit.'" In the 1999 Consumer Bankruptcy Project,'7
2001, at 2-3 (2002) ($52,275 median family income and $42,228 median household
income), with Ed Flynn, Gordon Bermant & Karen Bakewell, A Closer Look at Elderly
Chapter 7 Debtors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2002, at 34 tbl.2 (median income of
$24,336 in government sample of closed no-asset chapter 7 cases). In addition,
bankruptcy filers tend to have higher debt-income ratios than non-filers. See, e.g.,
Stavins, supra note 9, at 21 (evaluating 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances Data).
'3 Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, The Class of 2000, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct.
2001 (finding 56.2% of chapter 7 no-asset bankruptcy filers with medical debt on
bankruptcy schedules); Hugh F. Daly III, Leslie M. Oblak, Robert W. Seifert &
Kimberly Shellenberger, Into the Red To Stay in the Pink: The Hidden Cost of Being
Uninsured, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 39, 56 (2002) (finding 47% with medical debt among
Legal Aid Society of Greater Cincinnati clients who sought assistance with bankruptcy
filings in 2000-2001 based on their files with the Legal Aid office); Melissa B. Jacoby,
Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care
Financing: Evidence From the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 387 (2001)
[hereinafter Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates] (finding 31.2%
reported owing money to "health care providers, services, supplies" at time of
bankruptcy in 1999 Consumer Bankruptcy Project). For a lower rate in an unpublished
study, see Sugato Chakravarty & Eun-Young Rhee, Factors Affecting an Individual's
Bankruptcy Filing Decision, tbl.1, Panel B (1999) (Purdue University, unpublished
working paper, on file with author) (finding 40 families out of 284 bankrupt families
filed due to "excessive health care bills," and finding that 22.5% of filers with excessive
health care bills were in chapter 13).
14 Flynn & Bermant, supra note 13, at 20; Ed Flynn, Gordon Bermant &
Karen Bakewell, A Closer Look at Elderly Chapter 7 Debtors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr.
2002, at 22 tbl.2. In 4.4% of the cases, medical debt comprised one half or more of the
debtors' total unsecured debt. Flynn & Bermant, supra note 13, at 20.
Daly et al., supra note 13, at 56.
See, e.g., Glenn B. Canner et al., Recent Developments In Home Equity
Lending, 84 FED. RES. BuLL. 241, 248 tbl.8 (1998) (finding increase in borrowers
indicating medical expenses as use for home equity lines of credit and loans), at
httpJ/www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1998/1998041ead.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
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about a third of the debtors indicated that they had a
"substantial medical debt," namely a medical bill that exceeded
one thousand dollars, was not covered by insurance, and was
incurred within two years prior to bankruptcy.18
Households have medical-related debts notwithstanding
some insurance coverage, although data on insurance coverage
among bankruptcy filers remain sparse.'9 For example, the
1999 Consumer Bankruptcy Project defined those who have
entered "medical related bankruptcy" as persons who identified
illness or injury,' a substantial medical debt, or both,' as a
2004); Daly et al., supra note 13, at 45. Even David Caplovitz's study of judgment
debtors in the late 1960s found approximately 12% of debtors borrowed money to pay
medical and hospital bills. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE; A STUDY OF
DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 30 (1974). Beyond third party credit, "[olut-of-pocket medical
costs may well understate the full financial costs of an illness. There are expenditures
associated with an illness of a family member - transportation, reconfiguration of home
care environments, and so on - which people may not think of as medical costs and are
often not reimbursed." James P. Smith, Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets: The Dual
Relation Between Health and Economic Status, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 156 (1999).
Because of the difficulty of isolating medical debt from bankruptcy petitions, Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook did not separately tabulate medical debt in their study of
individuals who filed for bankruptcy in 1991. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK,
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 12, at 152.
'" The 1999 Consumer Bankruptcy Project was conducted by a sociologist, a
law professor, and a soon-to-be law professor during the first quarter of 1999 in the
bankruptcy courts of eight federal judicial districts. For a complete description, see
Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 13, at 389 (appendix
fully describing data and methods of 1999 project).
'8 Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 13, at 389.
Breaking the responses down by filing status, 44% of joint filers indicated substantial
medical debt as compared to 31% of single filing women and 27% of single filing men.
Id. at 393 fig.2; Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Medical
Problems and Bankruptcy Filings, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, MAY 2000, at 1, 5 fig.3
(2000) [hereinafter Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Medical Problems].
19 Bankruptcy researchers have not collected much information about health
insurance coverage of bankruptcy filers, in part because the government does not ask
for that information on the bankruptcy petition and schedules. SULLIVAN, WARREN &
WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 12, at 171-72 ("It is startling that the courts,
which ask for detailed information on income, require no information on a debtor's total
compensation package... we cannot know with certainty which of our petitioners were
not covered by insurance.").
20 Illness or injury was identified by 25.2% of survey respondents as a reason
for filing. Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 13, at 387.
The response was given most among joint filers (31%), and least among single-filing
men (18%), with single-filing women in the middle (26%). Id. at 393 fig.2; Jacoby,
Sullivan & Warren, Medical Problems, supra note 18, at 3 fig.1. Other frequent
responses were job, credit card, family breakup, and money management. Id. Cf
SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 12, at 153, 155,
157 (reporting that, in response to open-ended question about why they filed for
bankruptcy, 19% of sample in 1991 reported medical-related filings not including birth
or death of family member, and 7% specifically reported medical debt or the loss of
medical insurance as a major cause of their bankruptcy). See also VISA, U.S.A. INC.,
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: BANKRUPTCY DEBTOR SURVEY (1996), cited in Jacoby,
2004]
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reason for filing. Of those petitioners, eighty percent had some
insurance in their household at the time of filing,22 although
filers in this category may have had a temporal gap of
coverage." Looking at debtors with health providers as
creditors, even if they indicated insurance coverage, is an
important reminder of insurance incompleteness:
Table 1: Insurance and Providers of Health Services and Supplies
Filing Status and Insurance Health Provider is Creditor
Joint filers, both with insurance 39.9%
Single filer with insurance 25%
Joint filer, one with insurance 53.5%
No insurance 33.4%
Source: 1999 Consumer Bankruptcy Project"
Nearly forty percent of insured joint filers owed money
to health providers, a rate that is higher than for uninsured
filers. This discrepancy might be partly explained by the fact
that uninsured filers may have not been seeking as much
health care or may have received some uncompensated charity
care. To gain a better understanding of the nature and
Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 13, at 382 (reporting that 16.%
identified health and medical reasons for filing, and 14.3% identified medical problems
as the "last straw").
21 The 1999 study found about 46% of debtors in the aggregate. Jacoby,
Sullivan & Warren, Rethinking the Debates, supra note 13, at 375.
22 Id. at 407. Broken down by filing status, in the 1999 study, joint filers had
the highest rate of insurance (84%) followed by single filing women (79%) followed by
single filing men (74%). Jacoby, Sullivan & Warren, Medical Problems, supra note 18,
at 5 fig.3. See generally Stavins, supra note 9, at 21, 25 (finding 70.73% insurance rate
among bankruptcy filers in 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, and also finding that
those with health insurance were more likely to have filed for bankruptcy); JONATHAN
D. FISHER, THE EFFECT OF TRANSFER PROGRAMS ON PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY 15 (U.S.
Department of Labor, Working Paper No. 346, 2001) (reporting that "states with a
higher percentage of people with health insurance have higher [bankruptcy] filing
rates"); Chakravarty & Rhee, supra note 13, at 12 (finding that bankruptcy filing
population was more likely to be without Medicare coverage than non-filing population,
but filing population was significantly younger).
23 In measuring the uninsurance rate overall, researchers continue attempts
to distinguish between chronic uninsurance and periodic coverage gaps. See generally
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How MANY PEOPLE LACK HEALTH INSURANCE AND
FOR How LONG? 3-4 (May 2003) (reporting that the uninsured are not a static group,
estimating that about 25% of the non-elderly population, or 22% of the entire
population, was uninsured at any time during the year in 1998, and contending that
Current Population Survey statistics overstate full-year uninsurance rate), available at
ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/42xx/doc4210/05-12-Uninsured.pdf.
24 See supra note 17.
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duration of insurance coverage, the 2001 Consumer
Bankruptcy Project will more closely probe these issues."
Just like non-bankruptcy filers may be as indebted as
bankruptcy filers, many individuals outside of the bankruptcy
system may be facing substantial medical debt." In an Open
Society Institute study of Baltimore residents using community
clinics and resource centers, who are a much lower income
group overall than bankruptcy filers, 45.9 percent reported
currently owing money for a medical expense. The average
reported debt per person was $3,409,27 comprising roughly
forty-three percent of the reported average annual income in
the sample ($7,864)." Yet, in this study, 52.6 percent of the
individuals who owed money for medical care had some form of
insurance, and the majority of the insured, 62.2 percent, were
enrolled in Medicaid.29
Some debtors with medical problems confront multiple
creditors and multiple financial problems, which raises the
possibility that their indebtedness stems from a collage of
factors rather than one catastrophic medical problem. Previous
reports on the 1999 Consumer Bankruptcy Project have
25 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III (2001), Telephone Coding Book (on file
with author) (asking bankruptcy filers about gaps in coverage, whether they were
covered at the point of illness onset or injury, why coverage was suspended temporarily
or permanently if these events occurred, insurance premium costs, excluded items, and
disability insurance). For a more detailed description of this research, see Elizabeth
Warren, The Growing Threat to Middle Class Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 402 n.1
(2004) (describing the larger Consumer Bankruptcy Project, including each of the
decade projects, Consumer Bankruptcy Projects I, II and III).
16 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra
note 12, at 146 (discussing 1970s survey reporting "the number-one reason for taking
out personal loans other than for durable goods was to pay medical costs"). Medical
debt is also not unique to the United States. See generally Ke Xu, David B. Evans, Kei
Kawabata, Riadh Zeramdini, Jan Klavus & Christopher J.L. Murray, Household
Catastrophic Health Expenditure: A Multicountry Analysis, 362 LANCET 111 (2003);
Jacek Skarbinski, H. Kenneth Walker, Laurence C. Baker, Archil Kobaladze, Zviad
Kirtava & Thomas A. Raffin, The Burden of Out-of-Pocket Payments for Health Care in
Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1043 (2002) (finding that, in
country with no risk-pooling mechanisms, 19% of households seeking medical care had
to borrow or sell personal items to pay out of pocket health expenses).
27 THOMAS P. O'TOOLE, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE-BALTIMORE PROGRAM ON
MEDICINE AS A PROFESSION, BALTIMORE SAFETY NET ACCESS-TO-CARE SURVEY 2002:
How ARE PEOPLE ENDING UP IN THE SAFETY NET AND How SAFE ARE THEY?. (July 30,
2002), available at http://www.soros.org/baltimore/safetynetaccess.pdf.
2 Id.; see also DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE; A STUDY OF
DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 67-72 (1974) (finding that 7.5% of individual defendants in
collection lawsuits gave medical and hospital bills as a reason for default).
29 O'TOOLE, supra note 27. Presumably, the Medicaid recipients either agreed
to pay for uncovered services or they were inappropriately balance-billed.
2004]
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discussed the overlap of job problems and medical problems,0
but have not explored the overlap between medical problems
and debtors' identification of credit card problems, trouble with
managing money, and the possibility of home loss. The
following table shows the correlation between identifying
illness or injury as a reason for filing (twenty-five percent of
the sample) and these other filing "reasons:"
Table 2: Percentage of Those Identifying Illness or Injury as a Reason
for Filing Also Identifying Money-Related Reasons for Filing
Other Reasons Injury or Illness Correlation
Pearson's R
Credit cards out of control 41% -.096*
Trouble managing money 31.7* -.067"
May lose home 20.5** .072**
p .05 Source: 1999 Consumer Bankruptcy Projecte'
p! .001
p .000
These data illustrate a not-insubstantial portion of filers
who indicated illness or injury as a reason and who also
identified monetary problems. As the correlation statistics
suggest, however, those identifying illness or injury as a reason
for filing were less likely to also identify credit cards and money
management as reasons than those who did not identify illness
or injury; among those not identifying illness or injury as a
reason for filing, fifty-two percent identified credit cards out of
control as a reason and 39.1 percent identified trouble
managing money. In addition, money management, credit card,
or home foreclosure problems simply might be financial fallout
30 For cases illustrating the overlap, see, for example, United States v. Ascue
(In re Ascue), 268 B.R. 739, 743 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2001) (accident leading to surgery,
chronic pain, disability, and ultimately reduced capacity to work); Balaski v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Balaski), 280 B.R. 395, 399 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002) (severe
physical deformity hindered employment); Carlson v. UNIPAC Student Loan (In re
Carlson), 273 B.R. 481, 483 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2001) (spinal and brain injuries in car
accident rendered debtor unable to work full time); Rivera v. N.J. Higher Educ.
Student Assistant Auth. (In re Rivera), 284 B.R. 88, 92 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002) (debtor
instructed by doctor not to work in any field); Ivory v. United States (In re Ivory), 269
B.R. 890, 894-895, 910 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001) (missed work due to severe asthma and
systemic lupus leading to repeated termination of employment, leading court to
conclude that illness prevents debtor from working on full time daily basis;
prematurely born twins with chronic intestinal reflux, asthma, and heart problems
who a.tend private school that can accommodate their medication schedules); In re
Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 690-91 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001) (child's need for special structure
provided by private school).
31 See supra note 17.
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from the medical problem rather than a standalone problem.
Furthermore, the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project found
that eighty-seven percent of households with children gave only
three reasons for their filings: job loss, medical problems, or
family breakup."
The medical-related data, taken together, reveal the
nature and extent of debtor-creditor relationships that grow
out of medical care. In turn, these relationships carry a host of
legal consequences dictated by debtor-creditor and commercial
law, which, as the next Part illustrates, has particular limits
and disadvantages.
III. LEGAL LIMITS ON THE ABILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF DEBT
AND BANKRUPTCY TO FINANCE HEALTH CARE
A. Legal Limits of the Current Bankruptcy System
Individuals with medical problems and medical debts
mostly file two kinds of bankruptcy: chapter 7 and chapter 13.'
Chapter 7 refers to a process generally resulting in a swift
discharge of debt after the liquidation of any non-exempt
assets, although most debtors claim to have no such assets2 In
chapter 13, discussed in subpart 2, the discharge of debt is
generally deferred until the completion of a three-year, and
sometimes longer, payment plan, composed largely of past-due
mortgage or modified car loan payments.
The benefits of these types of bankruptcy for ill or
injured filers are coupled with significant limitations that
render bankruptcy a sub-optimal approach to health care
finance for patients, providers, and the community. Many of
the shortcomings of the bankruptcy system as health care
finance are not flaws, but rather important structural
limitations. Thus, changing bankruptcy law to make it more
hospitable to the ill or injured would be inappropriate, were it
32 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 3, at 81.
33 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts From the Ill and Injured: The
Rhetorical Significance, But Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51
AM. U. L. REV. 229 (2001) [hereinafter Jacoby, Collecting Debts] (presenting data on
chapter choice of medical-related filers and explaining differences between two
chapters).
34 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION: CASE RECEIPTS PAID TO CREDITORS
AND PROFESSIONALS 33 (1994).
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even possible. The subparts that follow address the noteworthy
attributes of bankruptcy law, and the limits of each.
1. Temporary, and Potentially Permanent, Injunction
on Debt Collection
A bankruptcy petition enjoins formal and informal
collection efforts relating to existing debts. 5 Generally, this
injunction lasts for the duration of the case, which may be a
few months or a few years, depending on the type of case and
the circumstances. After that, most debtors in chapter 7 and
some in chapter 13 receive the protection of a permanent
discharge injunction. Compared with other nations, the
United States bankruptcy law permits relatively unconditional
discharge of debts, particularly in chapter 7.3"
For an individual carrying debt due to her own medical
problems or those of a sick family member, filing for
bankruptcy will halt formal and informal collection actions,38
and ultimately may relieve her of personal liability for some
existing debts, including some relating to health.39 If the health
care crisis has passed, bankruptcy has the potential to bring
the debtor back to the status quo. If it persists, bankruptcy
may help the debtor adjust to the consequences of chronic
health problems, including, perhaps, a lower income.
Perhaps most significantly to a debtor with continuing
medical problems, however, the discharge injunction does not
affect debts incurred prospectively.0 To the extent that the
debtor will continue to need expensive medical care uncovered
35 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
36 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2000).
37 Compare PERSONAL INSOLVENCY TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT (CANADA), 103
(Aug. 2002) (comparing Canadian bankruptcy system to U.S. and other nations), with
Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We Cure A
Market Failure or a Social Problem?, 37 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 473, 491 (1999), and
Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 81 (2002). See
generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Generosity Versus Accessibility: Bankruptcy, Consumer
Credit, and Health Care Finance in the US, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 283 (lain Ramsay, William C. Whitford & Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen,
eds., 2003).
m See, e.g., In re Brigham, No. 01-10831-MWV, 2001 WL 1868123 (Bankr. D.
N.H. Dec. 17, 2001) (imposing punitive damages, compensatory damages, and legal fees
on Brigham and Women's Hospital for willfully violating automatic stay by continuing
to send collection notices after debtor-patient filed for bankruptcy of which hospital
was aware).
39 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727 (2000).
40 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2000).
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by insurance, the bills may quickly mount again,4 particularly
if work capacity is reduced.42 The Bankruptcy Code does not
permit the debtor to receive discharges in rapid succession,4 so
she cannot readily relieve subsequent medical-related debts.
Chronic health problems are a very real concern for bankruptcy
filers."
As a related matter, chapter 13 debtors generally cannot
sweep post-petition debts into the chapter 13 plan without
consent of the providers." This makes sense as a matter of
bankruptcy policy, but as a practical matter it means that a
chapter 13 debtor must manage plan payments and also pay
ongoing medical expenses in full, assuming their health care
providers will continue to treat them.46
In addition, neither the discharge injunction
specifically, nor bankruptcy generally, requires most third
parties to extend new credit to the debtor.7 The discharge
injunction therefore does not force medical providers to treat
delinquent debtors post-bankruptcy. Furthermore, an ill or
41 See, e.g., Phelps v. Cordia (In re Cordia), 280 B.R. 138, 147 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2001) (insulin dependent diabetic who had three heart attacks and had no
medical insurance due to preexisting conditions continued to accrue medical bills post
bankruptcy); Ivory v. United States (In re Ivory), 269 B.R. 890, 898-900 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 2001) (substantial medical debt post petition due to surgery, hospitalization, and
expensive prescription drugs, all of which cannot be discharged in this bankruptcy
case); In re Aschtgen, No. 01-01348-D, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 908 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa July
16, 2002) (medical expenses were post-petition and not affected by debtor's discharge);
England v. United States (In re England), 264 B.R. 38, 48 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001)
(uninsured debtor's hypokalemic paralysis could strike at any time causing
hospitalization, and children with some government health coverage will require
medication and additional care in future).
42 Jacoby, Collecting Debts, supra note 33, at 237.
43 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8), (9) (2000).
44 See supra notes 18, 30, and 41.
41 See, e.g., In re Sims, 288 B.R. 264 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2003) (noting that
debtor could not force post-petition medical creditors to file claims to be treated in
chapter 13 repayment plan and then discharged).
46 See, e.g., In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 688-689 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001) (noting
that physician seemed willing to continue to treat debtor and child, but ongoing bills
would have been substantial, with $500 per month in psychiatric treatments and
$22,500 for multiple surgeries).
47 See generally MICHAEL E. STATEN, THE IMPACT OF POST-BANKRUPTCY
CREDIT ON THE NUMBER OF PERSONAL BANKRUPTCIES (Krannert Graduate School of
Management-Purdue University, Working Paper No. 58, 1993); DAVID K. MUSTO, THE
REACQUISITION OF CREDIT FOLLOWING CHAPTER 7 PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY (Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania, Working Paper, 1999).
48 For an anecdote from a study of interviews with more than 130 health
providers and patients, see, for example, Second-Class Medicine, CONSUMER REPS.,
Sept. 2000, at 42 (reporting on Community Health Center that instituted a policy that
it would not permit future appointments for bankruptcy filers who owed money to the
clinic).
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injured debtor will not necessarily be relieved of all large debts,
even if they were incurred pre-bankruptcy. For example, some
individuals take on home equity loans or lines of credit to
finance their health care.49 Because that debt is secured, and
particularly because it is secured by the debtor's principal
residence, the debtor must pay that debt in full or she will lose
her home.' Debtors also sometimes agree to remain liable on
particular debts through reaffirmation agreements, and this
could include medical-related debts." Moreover, a debtor may
not discharge an obligation to pay a child or ex-spouse's health
expenses or insurance if it is in the nature of support for which
the debtor is responsible.2
Importantly, to get a discharge from chapter 13, a
debtor generally must finish her repayment plan.' Most
chapter 13 filers do not complete their plans.' Data from the
49 Canner et al., supra note 16, at 248 tbl.8 (1998) (noting an increase in
borrowers indicating medical expenses as use for home equity lines of credit and loans),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1998/1998041ead.pdf; Daly et
al., supra note 13, at 45; Letter from Robert M. Hayes, President, Medicare Rights
Center, to U.S. House Representatives (Mar. 18, 2003) (opposing bankruptcy
legislation and discussing use of bankruptcy by ill or injured seniors to save their
homes that they have mortgaged for medical expenses).
50 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727(b) (2000) (limiting the discharge to liability on
claims, not creditors' in rem rights in collateral).
51 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2000); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt
After Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L. J. 709, 752
(1999) (identifying reaffirmation of $1,433 medical bill at unstated interest rate). In
addition, certain categories of debts (e.g., child support, taxes, student loans) are not
dischargeable under most circumstances. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1), (5), (8), (15) (2000).
Other debts are not dischargeable in chapter 7 if they involved some debtor wrongdoing
(e.g., if incurred fraudulently or if arising from willful and malicious injury). 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2), (6) (2000); Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998); Field v. Mans, 516
U.S. 59 (1995).
52 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), (15) (2000); Basile v. Basile (In re Basile),
288 B.R. 833, 840 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003) (holding that debtor's obligation to provide
health insurance for former spouse was in nature of support, pursuant to state court
judgment, and thus nondischargeable). Compare In re Dixon, 245 B.R. 367, 369 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2000) (holding that divorce decree required non-debtor-ex-spouse to pay
child's medical expenses, so debtor was not responsible), with Kimball v. Kimball (In re
Kimball), 253 B.R. 920, 926 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) (holding that no evidence that
payment of medical bills was allocated to debtor in nature of support).
11 U.S.C. § 1329 (2000). Although the statute permits courts to grant a
"hardship discharge" to debtors who fail to finish their plans under limited
circumstances, this option is infrequently granted. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S.
TRUSTEE, CHAPTER 13 STANDING TRUSTEE FY2002 AUDITED ANNUAL REPORTS 29-35
(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust /library/chapterl3chl3ar2-AARpt.pdf.
For data on chapter 13 plan completion suggesting that the majority of
chapter 13 filings do not result in completed plans, see Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn,
Measuring Projected Performance in Chapter 13: Comparisons Across the States, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2000, at 22; MICHAEL BORK & SUSAN D. TUCK, BANKRUPTCY
STATISTICAL TRENDS: CHAPTER 13: DISPOSITIONS (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,
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1999 Consumer Bankruptcy Project revealed that nearly half of
the chapter 13 sample indicated medical-related bankruptcy,
and most of them also indicated job problems that decrease the
likelihood of plan completion."5 Thus, a large volume of chapter
13 filers with illness or injury may be even less likely to receive
the protection of the permanent discharge injunction associated
with receipt of the discharge.
Finally, pending bankruptcy reform legislation, if
enacted, will weaken both the automatic stay and the discharge
injunction.' The legislation adds a host of new exceptions to the
automatic stay and new exceptions to discharge. 7 While they
are not specifically directed to medical-related filers, they will
complicate the system and affect all users.' The legislation also
aims to shift more debtors into chapter 13,' where receiving a
discharge is less likely.
In sum, both under the existing system and the system
contemplated by pending legislation, bankruptcy offers potent
but inherently limited debt relief to those with chronic health
problems.
Working Paper No. 2, Oct. 1. 1994); Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New
Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 440 (1999); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of
Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 145 (1994); SULLIVAN,
WARREN & WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE, supra note 12, at 215-17. Professor Girth
found a higher completion rate, but was looking only at confirmed plans. Marjorie L.
Girth, The Role of Empirical Data in Developing Bankruptcy Legislation for
Individuals, 65 IND. L.J. 17, 42 (1989).
55 Jacoby, Collecting Debts, supra note 33, at 237.
The latest version is the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975, 108th Congress, introduced on Feb. 27, 2003, but the
prior three congresses also have seriously considered and come close to passing
omnibus bankruptcy legislation.
5' See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2003, H.R. 975, 108th Cong. § 214 (2003) (exceptions to automatic stay in domestic
support obligation proceedings); id. § 220 (expanded nondischargeability of student
loans); id. § 310 (expanded nondischargeability of cash advances and "luxury goods");
id. § 311 (exceptions to automatic stay for residential landlords); id. § 312 (longer time
between bankruptcy discharges); id. § 314 (expanded nondischargeability of credit card
debts incurred to pay taxes, expanded nondischargeability in chapter 13). See generally
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18
BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 35 (2001) (discussing "systematic weakening" of discharge in reform
bill).
58 DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 205, 208 (2001).
'9 See, e.g., H.R. 975, § 102 (basing dismissal or conversion of chapter 7 cases
on ability to repay portion of debts according to formula).
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2. Saving Access to Homes and Cars
Individuals sometimes seek bankruptcy protection when
they have defaulted on a home or car loan and fear
repossession or foreclosure. Chapter 13 permits debtors to cure
a home mortgage default over the objection of the secured
lender, and to modify the terms of a car loan to reduce the
required payments.' These tools are not explicitly related to
health, but they may be attractive to ill or injured filers.6' A
bankruptcy filer might have fallen behind on these obligations
during a period of medical and financial crisis. Or, as
mentioned previously, a bankruptcy filer might have financed
medical care with a loan secured by their homes." Both
possibilities help explain not only why such a large proportion
of chapter 13 payments go to secured creditors,' but also why
so many ill or injured debtors use chapter 13, which otherwise
might seem poorly suited to them.' However, because plan
completion rates do not reveal the success or failure of home
and car saving, it is not known whether this tactic works."
Even if chapter 13 helps the ill or injured keep their
homes and cars, pending bankruptcy legislation, if enacted,
will alter this part of the system. Debtors will have to pay more
to retain their cars, and in some cases their homes, than they
do today." Some will not be able to confirm plans. 7 Thus, if the
60 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2000) (permitting modification of rights of holders
of secured claims other than claim secured only by debtor's principal residence); id. §
1325(a)(5)(B) (declaring that court shall confirm plan if it permits secured creditor to
retain lien and pays equivalent of present value of allowed secured claim). See
generally In re Kidd, 315 F.3d 671, 675 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing so-called "cram
down" of secured claim in chapter 13 by permitting confirmation of plan over
undersecured creditor's objection if plan pays creditor value of collateral plus
appropriate interest rate).
61 The 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project will collect more detailed
information on the extent to which health problems impede debtors' ability to maintain
housing payments.
r2 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
63 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. TRUSTEE, CHAPTER 13 STANDING
TRUSTEE FY2002 AUDITED ANNUAL REPORTS (2003) (about 57 % of Chapter 13
distributions allocated to secured debt payments), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/library/chapterl3/chl3ar2-AARpt.pdf.
See Jacoby, Collecting Debts, supra note 33. It also is possible that a debtor
might use chapter 13 in an effort to seek to repay her medical provider over time
through a chapter 13 plan in the hopes of maintaining access to health services.
Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many
Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 510 (1993).
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R.
975, 108th Cong. §§ 306, 309 (2003) (forestalling release of lien until the end of the plan
or payment in full, restricting the ability to modify purchase money loans and other
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bill becomes law, chapter 13 may not be a viable method for
debtors to retain their homes and cars, particularly debtors
who may have greater difficulty adhering to a multi-year
payment plan due to ongoing medical problems and related job
problems.
3. Relatively Unbureaucratic Accessibility
Bankruptcy's accessibility may be a "benefit" for debtor-
patients relative to other social welfare programs. Social
welfare programs often entail bureaucracy, multiple trips to
different offices, repeated eligibility verifications, and little or
no integration between various services.' Knowledgeable
consideration of one's options in the social welfare realm is
difficult without legal or counseling advice.' Medicaid, for
example, divides eligibility into many separate categories." It is
a "horribly complicated law' that is "almost unintelligible to
the uninitiated."2 Perhaps in part as a result of social welfare
programs' complex bureaucratic and administrative barriers,
loans within certain time periods prior to filing, expanding the definition of principal
residence to prevent modification of loans secured by manufactured housing, changing
treatment of secured debt upon conversion to chapter 7, and imposing new
requirements for adequate protection of creditors in chapter 13). In addition, the bill
requires that chapter 13 plans of certain debtors have a five year duration. See id. §
318.
67 See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the
United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (2001); Gary Klein, Impact of Pending Bankruptcy
Legislation on Low Income Debtors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2000, at 182.
"See, e.g., MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM
RHETORIC TO REFORM 152 (1994).
69 See generally id. at 134-35 (discussing how public assistance programs
such as welfare, food stamps, Medicaid, and housing assistance seem to change
continuously and to become ever more complicated, such that "eligiblity rules and
benefit levels have become even more of a black box to clients and workers .. .more
and more mysterious, and apparently arbitrary to workers and clients"); Wayne Moore,
Improving the Delivery of Legal Services to the Elderly: A Comprehensive Approach, 41
EMORY L. J. 805, 811 (1992) (stating that 28% of the legal needs of the elderly were
related to complexities of health coverage and citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,
WISCONSIN ELDER LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, 2 THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION
ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY 6 (1991)).
'0 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2000); Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau,
Medicaid at Thirty-five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 11 n.24, 17 (2001). See also Jane
Perkins, Medicaid: Past Successes and Future Challenges, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 7, 11
(2002) (describing eligibility requirements); Ann C. McGinley, Aspirations and Reality
in the Law and Politics of Health Care Reform: Examining a Symposium on (E)qual(ity)
Care for the Poor, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 7, 11-12 (1994).
" Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 70, at 38-39. See also Perkins, supra
note 70, at 9 (describing complexity and unintelligibility of Medicaid).
72 Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976).
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millions of eligible people are not enrolled, which researchers
are working hard to understand. 3
By contrast, chapter 7 bankruptcy has no eligibility
requirement." The grounds for rejecting a bankruptcy petition
at the outset are practically non-existent,5 the amount of
information initially required is minimal, and the entry fee has
been described as modest compared to that of other nations. 6
Chapter 13's eligibility requirements are fairly limited: a
73 IAN HILL & AMY WESTPHAL LuTzKY, GETTING IN, NOT GETTING IN, AND
WHY: UNDERSTANDING SCHIP ENROLLMENT (Urban Institute, Occasional Paper No.
66, 2003) (observing that SCHIP application has been simplified more than Medicaid,
observing inconsistencies that increase confusion, and finding high rate of rejections
from SCHIP for procedural reasons); LISE MCKEAN, CENTER FOR IMPACT RESEARCH,
ACCESS TO INCOME SUPPORTS FOR WORKING FAMILIES IN CHICAGO (Oct. 2002);
BARENTS GROUP LLC, FINAL REPORT ON "REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON
EVALUATIONS OF OUTREACH FOR PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE AND SELECTED OTHER
PROGRAMS" (Mar. 31, 2002), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/
outreach/rpt33100.pdf; LISA DUBAY, JENNIFER HALEY & GENEVIEVE KENNEY, URBAN
INSTITUTE, CHILDREN'S ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID AND SCHIP: A VIEW FROM 2000
(Mar. 2002), available at http://www.urban.org(UploadedPDF/310435.pdf; JENNIFER P.
STUBER, KATHLEEN A. MALOY, SARA ROSENBAUM & KAREN C. JONES, BEYOND STIGMA:
WHAT BARRIERS ACTUALLY AFFECT THE DECISIONS OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES TO
ENROLL IN MEDICAID? (George Washington University Medical Center, Issue Brief,
July 2000); DAHLIA K. REMLER, JASON E. RACHLIN & SHERRY A. GLIED, WHAT CAN THE
TAKE-Up OF OTHER PROGRAMS TEACH US ABOUT HOW TO IMPROVE TAKE-UP OF
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAMS? (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working
Paper No. 8185, Mar. 2001); LEE ANN HALL, GWEN HAMPTON & DEEPAK BHARGAVA,
NATIONAL HOUSING INSTITUTE, BRINGING DOWN THE BARRIERS: LOW-INCOME LEADERS
ADDRESS OBSTACLES To ENROLLMENT IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS (Nov./Dec. 2000),
available at http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/ll4/organize.html; Avery S. Hart,
America's Health Care Safety Net: Intact But Endangered, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2117
(2000) (book review); MICHAEL J. PERRY, EVAN STARK & R. BURCIAGA VALDEZ, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, BARRIERS To MEDI-CAL ENROLLMENT AND IDEAS FOR
IMPROVING ENROLLMENT: FINDINGS FROM EIGHT FOCUS GROUPS IN CALIFORNIA WITH
PARENTS OF POTENTIALLY ELIGIBLE CHILDREN (Sept. 1998), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/1436-index.cfm; MICHAEL PERRY, SUSAN KANNEL, R.
BURCIAGA VALDEZ & CHRSTINA CHANG, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
MEDICAID AND CHILDREN OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ENROLLMENT: FINDINGS FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2174-
index.cfn; GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY, JENNIFER M. HALEY & FRANK ULLMAN, URBAN
INSTITUTE, MOST UNINSURED CHILDREN ARE IN FAMILIES SERVED BY GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS (Dec. 1999) (noting many eligible children are uninsured and yet participate
in other government programs, such as National School Lunch program); JOEL S.
WEISSMAN, PAUL DRYFOOS & KATHERINE LONDON, INCOME LEVELS OF BAD-DEBT AND
FREE CARE PATIENTS IN MASSACHUSSETTS HOSPITALS: DOES UNCOMPENSATED CARE
SERVE THE TRULY NEEDY?, 18 HEALTH AFF. 156-66 (1999) (estimating that many "bad
debt" patients were sufficiently low income to have been enrolled in public programs).
74 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2000).
'5 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005(a)(1) ("The clerk shall not refuse to accept for
filing any petition or other paper presented for the purpose of filing solely because it is
not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules or
practices.").
76 Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L. J.
81, 107-108 (2002).
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debtor must have "regular income" and her debt must not
exceed a certain threshold." In any event, the court probably
would examine these factors only if challenged, and, even then,
only after the debtor already has received automatic stay
protection.78
Likewise, courts screen and punish wrongdoers in
bankruptcy only after the debtor has entered the system. For
example, a court can deny the debtor's discharge for
wrongdoing,"9 which might also give rise to criminal sanctions,"
and can dismiss a case for cause, such as bad faith
8
' or
substantial abuse. 2 Yet, the system essentially presumes good
faith until shown otherwise.
While this more open approach has drawbacks, it does
minimize administrative complexity and barriers to access.
Bankruptcy may be attractive to households in financial
trouble because of its less intrusive bureaucracy and its lack of
complicated eligibility requirements. Whether the substantive
aspects of bankruptcy are well-suited toward the problems of
the chronically ill is, of course, another matter.
Technically, pending bankruptcy reform would change
eligibility only slightly, but the overall impact on accessibility
77 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
78 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 109.01 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed. 1996
rev. 2003).
79 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2000); San Jose v. McWilliams, 284 F.3d 785 (7th Cir.
2002) (finding requisite elements to prove debtor transferred or concealed property
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud); Sholdra v. Chilmark Financial (In re Sholdra),
249 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of discharge for knowingly making false
oath). See generally Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992) (citing denial
of discharge among list of penalties for submitting fraudulent claims).
80 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-157 (2000); U.S. v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir.
2003) (affirming bankruptcy fraud conviction for concealing gaming chips, bearer
bonds, and cash from bankruptcy court); U.S. v. Sabbeth, 277 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2001)
(denying motion for reconsideration of sentencing for bankruptcy fraud and money
laundering). See generally Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644 (identifying title 18 criminal
sanctions as remedy for debtor or debtor attorney wrongdoing).
81 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2000). Compare Tamecki v. Frank (In re Tamecki), 229
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding bad faith as ground for dismissal for cause), with
Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that bad faith
filing is not a ground for dismissal under section 707(a)).
82 11 U.S.C. § 707(a), (b) (2000); Taylor v. United States (In re Taylor), 212
F.3d 395 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding dismissal for substantial abuse); Kornfield v.
United States (In re Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding dismissal for
substantial abuse of high income gastroenterologist). United States trustees are now
screening quite carefully for substantial abuse. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 20 (Apr. 8, 2003) (statement of Lawrence Friedman, Director, Executive Office
for United States Trustees, Department of Justice).
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would be considerable.' Indeed, some proponents of pending
reforms have cited other government programs as the model for
bankruptcy reform."4 The legislation conditions bankruptcy
eligibility on seeking and receiving pre-bankruptcy consumer
counseling from non-governmental counseling services, which
may entail a fee. Other new provisions that may serve as de
facto barriers to access include: 1) analyzing all chapter 7
filings through an ability-to-pay standard that is adapted
awkwardly from Internal Revenue Service guidelines and does
not take into account the legitimacy of the debtor's "need" for
bankruptcy relief;' 2) new restrictions and, potentially,
financial sanctions, on lawyers who represent consumer
debtors;7 3) new restrictions on repeat bankruptcy filings;' and
4) automatically dismissing cases in which debtors miss certain
administrative deadlines."
Although the principle behind each of these changes has
merit, in the aggregate and as drafted they will make
bankruptcy look more like the government programs that
experience low take-up rates. Bankruptcy may become less
accessible to individuals with health problems and may provide
less relief for those who do gain access to the system. This
reduced accessibility and generosity may correspondingly
increase the risk of financing health care with debt.
a3 See generally SKEEL, supra note 58, at 208 (describing how legislation
increases costs of, and consequently discourages consumers from, filing for
bankruptcy); Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion: Debtor
Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33 (1998).
Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means Testing, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 177, 182 (1999); Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Recommendations for
Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, in NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NExT TWENTY YEARS 1043(1997); Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for
Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, in NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION,
supra, at 1123.
85 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R.
975, 108th Cong. § 106 (2003).
86 Id. § 102 (2003). For an analysis of this and related provisions, see Jacoby,
Collecting Debts, supra note 33, at 253-57; Melissa B. Jacoby, Generosity Versus
Accessibility: Bankruptcy, Consumer Credit, and Health Care Finance in the US, in
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 283, 295-97 (lain Ramsay, William
C. Whitford & Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen eds., 2003); Sommer, supra note 83, at 50
(explaining that bill does not look at individualistic determinations).
87 H.R. 975, § 102.
98 Id. § 302.
Id. § 316.
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B. Adverse Effects of Debt-Based Health Care Finance and
Medical-Related Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is part of a broader debtor-creditor system.
The debtor-creditor system includes the multiple state and
federal laws that function together to govern relationships
between those who owe money and those who seek to collect it.'
This system includes elements from an array of first-year law
school courses - an amalgamation of property, contract, tort,
and civil procedure principles, with some constitutional
limitations and occasionally a criminal component - with an
overlay of bankruptcy, secured transactions, and consumer
protection law. Although debt can arise in a variety of ways,
this discussion focuses principally on contractually-created
debts. A multifaceted compilation of statutory and common law
imposes some administrative and disclosure responsibilities on
the contracting parties and restricts the enforceability of the
bargain under some circumstances,"1 but generally permits
debtors and creditors to strike their own deals and permits
creditors to enforce them through informal and formal means.
A debt may be legally enforceable even though the
obligor does not understand how much she owes and the cost of
the credit. Thus, although some patients with private
insurance may assume they bear no personal liability for the
cost of their care, they are often incorrect as a legal and
practical matter. They also may have had insurance plans that
can best be described as "shallow," or may have hit more
generous coverage caps or exclusions; 2 either way they are
liable for the cost of their care. Whether they owe the money to
the provider or to some third-party lender, patients are debtors
just the same, to the extent that credit enabled them to obtain
services or goods without paying in cash up front. Even
90 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 311, 312 (1982); LYNN M. LOPUCKI &
ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (4th ed. 2003).
9' See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692-1692o (2000);
id. § 1637 (section of the Truth in Lending Act requiring disclosure for open end credit).
92 Uwe Reinhart speaks of the "shallow insurance" held by some American
patients. Uwe Reinhart, Reforming the Health Care System: The Universal Dilemma,
in THE SOCIAL MEDICINE READER 451 (Gail E. Henderson, Nancy M.P. King, Ronald P.
Strauss, Sue E. Estroff & Larry R. Churchill eds., 1997). See also Chad Therune, Thin
Cushion: Fast-Growing Health Plan Has A Catch: $1,000-a-Year Cap, WALL ST. J., May
14, 2003, at Al. For an account of lifetime maximums from the news media, see
Michelle Andrews, When Insurance Hits the Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, § 3, at
10.
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Medicaid or Medicare recipients may accrue debt from
healthcare; government programs are not comprehensive in
their coverage, and thus providers may ask beneficiaries to
acknowledge their personal liability for uncovered goods or
services at the outset. 3 The individual needing health services
has a dual role of patient and debtor, with the latter role
propelling her into the commercial debtor-creditor world.'
When a debtor does not pay on time, a creditor owed
money for medical treatment or any other purpose must decide
how to respond. The creditor might do nothing. It might add
interest and late fees. It might attempt collection or hire one or
more debt collectors," any of whom may attempt informal
collection methods such as telephone calls and letters. If it
cannot find the debtor, the creditor or collection agency may
employ skip tracing." The creditor might pursue payment from
a guarantor or co-obligor. It could report the debtor's
delinquency to credit bureaus. 7 It might file a lawsuit, obtain a
judgment, and then garnish the debtor's wages or have the
sheriff levy on the debtor's non-exempt property.' If it has a
security interest in the debtor's personal property, it might
repossess and dispose of the property and sue the debtor for
any remainder.' If it has a security interest in real property,
the creditor has similar rights but must go through a different
93 Some debt for which patients are charged may not be legitimate, such as
when providers of health services and supplies run afoul of "balance billing"
prohibitions in Medicare and Medicaid. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(C) (2000); 42
C.F.R. 447.15 (2002); Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Medical
Assistance Program, General Provider Transmittal #51 (Feb. 16, 1999) (admonishing
health providers for engaging in unlawful balance billing); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, BALANCE BILLING
FOR MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 6 (Jan. 2001) (reporting on survey findings
that Medicare beneficiaries inappropriately overpaid by $30 million).
For a different analysis of the dual role of patients, see Wendy K Mariner,
Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts: Distinguishing Patient Rights and
Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 1 (1998).
95 Robert M. Frohlich Jr., Effective Reassignment of Accounts Can Decrease
Bad Debt, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., July 1, 1994, at 36.
96 Id. (identifying use of skip tracing by secondary collection agency
placement to collect health provider debts).
97 The disclosure of credit information by credit bureaus is regulated by the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2000), and the recently passed
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, H.R. 2622, 108th Cong. § 101
(2003) (reauthorizing Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption of state law).
98 See generally Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the
Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy
Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 353-57 (1993) (providing overview of individual coercive
collection process).
U.C.C. §§ 9-607, 9-609, 9-625, 9-626 (2002).
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process to foreclose, depending on state law."'0 If the debtor files
for bankruptcy, the creditor can exercise the creditors' rights
that bankruptcy law offers.' The creditor also can refuse to
deal with that particular debtor again.
Health care providers, or collectors acting on their
behalf, seem to be fairly regular participants in these informal
and formal debt collection processes.'2 Accounts sometimes get
sent quickly to collection agencies specializing in the full-time
business of encouraging payment,' 3 and sometimes get sent to
a second collection agency for more persistent efforts."'
Providers may try to collect debts from patients pending
'0o LYNN M. LoPuCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 29 (4th ed. 2003).
10' In a personal bankruptcy case, those rights include filing a claim, seeking
relief from the automatic stay, seeking dismissal of the debtor's case for cause,
objecting to the debtor's discharge of a particular debt or all debts, objecting to the
debtor's proposed treatment of the creditor, or objecting to the exemptions claimed by
the debtor.
102 See, e.g., O'TOOLE, supra note 27 (noting that 37.5% of those interviewed
and 81% of those with a medical debt reported having been referred to a collection
agency for medical bills); Daly et al., supra note 13, at 47-49; GRACE ROLLINS,
CONNECTICUT CENTER FOR A NEW ECONOMY, UNCHARITABLE CARE: YALE-NEW HAVEN'S
HOSPITAL'S CHARITY CARE AND COLLECTIONS PRACTICES (Jan. 2003) (listing examples
of aggressive collection attempts, some of which also received coverage in the Wall
Street Journal), available at http://www.ctneweconomy.orgpdffUC.pdf; CHAMPAIGN
COUNTY HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS, HOW MEDICAL DEBT AFFECTS CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
CONSUMERS: A COMMUNITY REPORT ON MEDICAL-DEBT-RELATED BANKRUPTCIES AND
SMALL CLAIMS LAWSUITS (July 11, 2002), available at http://www.shout.net/-geo/pdf/
MedicalDebtReport.pdf; News Release, Jay MacDonald, Bankrate.com, Medical Bills
Can Make Your Credit Sick, available at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/
news/insur/20020828a.asp (last updated Aug. 12, 2003); Susan D. Kovac, Judgment-
Proof Debtors in Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 675, 710 (1991); NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL
SURVEY ON HEALTH CARE (June 2002) (reporting that 12% are contacted by collection
agencies about medical bills), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/3238-index.cfm; cf
Colleen M. Flood, Mark Stabile & Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, The Borders of Solidarity:
How Countries Determine the Public/Private Mix in Spending and the Impact on
Health Care, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 297, 343 n.177 (2002) (reporting that New Zealand
revoked user fee for public hospitals in part due to cost and difficulty of collection).
'03 Daly et al., supra note 13, at 47-49. For discussion of whether hospitals
engage in an appropriate amount of collection activity, compare Joel S. Weissman, Paul
Dryfoos & Katharine London, Income Levels of Bad-debt and Free-Care Patients in
Massachusetts Hospitals: Does Uncompensated Care Serve the Truly Needy?, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 1999, at 156 (finding very small percentage of high income bad debt
cases, "suggesting that Massachusetts hospitals adequately collect debts from patients
who are able to pay"), with M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline:
Medical Care and the Charitable Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299, 371 (1995)
(suggesting hospitals may be soft on bad debt cases to fulfill their charitable
obligations, shifting care away from needier patients).
104 Robert M. Frohlich, Jr., Effective Reassignment of Accounts Can Decrease
Bad Debt, 48 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 36 (1994); Ray B. Lefton, Developing
Organizational Charity-Care Policies and Procedures, 56 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 52,
54 (2002).
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insurance company reimbursement,' °° or from patients who are
not legally liable because the provider must accept government
program reimbursement as payment in full."
Medical providers face considerable pressure to
minimize bad debt."7 After all, many healthcare providers
struggle financially, leading them to close their doors' 8 or even
file bankruptcy themselves." They struggle even more when
105 See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 102 (relaying incidents and describing
how patients are caught in crossfire between providers and insurers).
'06 See supra note 93.
107 Frohlich, supra note 104; Lefton, supra note 104.
108 For a recent example of a hospital closing its doors, see Anne Barnard, Flat
Line at Waltham Hospital: Financial Pressures Force a City Institution to Close its
Doors, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 2003, at Al.
'09 For examples of health provider bankruptcies, see Continental Securities
Corp. v. Shenandoah Nursing Home P'ship (In re Shenandoah Nursing Home P'ship),
104 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 1996), In re Wilmar Nursing Home, Inc., 996 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.
1993), Riverside Nursing Home v. N. Metro. Residential Health Care Facility Inc., 977
F.2d 78 (2nd Cir. 1992), Sullivan v. Town & Country Home Nursing Services, Inc. (In
re Town & Country Home Nursing Services, Inc.), 963 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1991),
Matter of Greene County Hosp., 835 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1988), Local 144 Hosp. Welfare
Fund v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of New York, Inc. (In re Baptist Med. Ctr. of New York, Inc.),
781 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1986), Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo
v. Mora (In re Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo), 805 F.2d
440 (1st Cir. 1986), In re Martin Place Hosp., 793 F.2d 1292 (6th Cir. 1986), Sisk v.
Saugus Bank and Trust Co. (In re Saugus General Hosp., Inc.), 698 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.
1983), Scharffenberger v. United Creditors Alliance Corp. (In re Allegheny Health,
Educ., and Research Foundation), 292 B.R. 68 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003), Holyoke
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Health Care Financing Admin. (In re Holyoke Nursing Home,
Inc.), 273 B.R. 305 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002), NovaCare Holdings, Inc. v. Mariner Post-
Acute Network, Inc. (In re Mariner Post-Acute Network, Inc.), 267 B.R. 46 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2001), Tabas v. Grennleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc.), 269
B.R. 721 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001), In re Greater Southeast Comty. Hosp. Foundation
Inc., No. 99-01159, 2001 WL 1138057 (Bankr. D. Colo. June 11, 2001), Hillard Dev.
Corp. v. Weinstein (In re Richmond Health Care, Inc.), 243 B.R. 899 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2000), In re Winsted Mem'l Hosp., 249 B.R. 588 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000), Solow v.
United States (In re Johnson Rehabilitation Nursing Home, Inc.), 239 B.R. 168 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1999), In re Union Hosp. Ass'n of the Bronx, 226 B.R. 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1998), Robiner v. Beechknoll Nursing Homes, Inc. (In re Beechknoll Nursing Homes),
216 B.R. 925 (S.D. Ohio 1997), Hunter v. St. Vincent Medical Ctr. (In re Parkview
Hosp.), 211 B.R. 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997), In re Heffernan Memorial Hosp. Dist.,
202 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996), In re New Center Hosp., 200 B.R. 592 (E.D. Mich
1996), Geriatrics Nursing Home, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. (In re Geriatrics
Nursing Home, Inc.), 187 B.R. 128 (D. N.J. 1995), Kings Terrace Nursing Home and
Health Related Facility v. New York State Dep't of Social Services (In re Kings Terrace
Nursing Home and Health Related Facility), 184 B.R. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), Skilled
Nursing Profl Services v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.
of Norristown), 175 B.R. 543 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994), Successor Committee of Creditors
Holding Unsecured Claims v. Bergen Brunswig Drug Co. (In re Ladera Heights Cmty.
Hosp., Inc.), 152 B.R. 964 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993), In re St. Joseph's Hosp., 126 B.R. 37
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991), St. Louis South Park II, Inc. v. Missouri Helath Facilities
Review Comm. (In re Saint Louis South Park II, Inc.), 111 B.R. 260 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1990), Russell v. Bean (In re Provident Hosp., Inc.), 122 B.R. 683 (D. Md. 1990), In re
Tidewater Memorial Hosp., Inc., 106 B.R. 885 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), In re Mem'l
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financially strapped states reduce programs that reimburse
healthcare providers.'0
The debtor-creditor system contains concepts that
generally are not taught in health law classes, discussed at
health law conferences, or integrated into health care policy
debates. They nonetheless are very much a part of health care
for many patients and providers. Several specific and
potentially negative implications are discussed below.
1. Increased Costs
Credit enables patients to access care without Dr.
Hahnemann's required payment-in-advance, but credit is not
free. Whether a debtor finances health care through third-
party credit or directly with the provider, the cost of health
care ultimately may include interest and extra charges. The
costs are amplified in bankruptcy even as some debt is
discharged. In bankruptcy, debtors pay filing fees,"' lawyers'
fees in the hundreds or thousands of dollars,"' and probably
face more expensive credit after bankruptcy."3 Consumer credit
counseling plans have associated charges as well.
Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 82 B.R. 478 (W.D. Wisc. 1988), and In re Miami General
Hosp., Inc., 81 B.R. 682 (S.D. Fla. 1988). See generally Gerben DeJong, Susan E.
Palsbo, Phillip W. Beatty, Gwyn C. Jones, Thilo Kroll & Melinda T. Neri, The
Organization and Financing of Health Services for Persons with Disabilities, 80
MILBANK Q. 261, 283 (2002) (explaining that several of the largest skilled nursing
facilities have filed for bankruptcy or closed); Nathalie D. Martin & Elizabeth Rourke,
Les Jeux Ne Sont Pas Fait: The Right to Dignified Long-Term Care in the Face of
Industry-Wide Financial Failure, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 129 (2000); Ann
Saphir, Bankruptcies' Ripple Effects: Chapter 11 Filings Aren't Affecting Operations
But Homes' Future Access to Capital Likely to Suffer, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 20,
2000, at 50 (noting that 10% of the nation's nursing homes are in chapter 11
bankruptcy according to American Health Care Association).
"0 See, e.g., Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Cutbacks Imperil Health Coverage for
States'Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at Al.
.. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1006 (2003) (requiring payment of filing fee); 28 U.S.C. §
1930 (2000) (prescribing filing fees of $155 for chapters 7 or 13, in addition to other
fees).
112 See, e.g., Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 81, 107 n.126 (2002) (collecting data on attorneys' fees in U.S.); U.S.
BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA, GUIDELINES FOR
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CHAPTER 13 CASES, at
http://www.insb.uscourts.gov/Chapterl3FeeGuidlines.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2004)
(providing guidelines for chapter 13 debtors' attorneys' fees in Southern District of
Indiana, and setting $2,000 as the maximum fee, with some exceptions). For a
discussion of the disparity of fees and practices related to fees, see Jean Braucher,
Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501,
546-548 (1993).
113 See, e.g., News Release, Myvesta, Secret Financial and Emotional Costs of
Bankruptcy Take a Toll on American Families (Mar. 8, 2001) (credit counseling group
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As a related matter, using debt to finance health
increases the economic vulnerability of the household by
raising the stakes if the borrower cannot pay. As noted
previously, those who finance health costs with home equity or
other secured loans may lose their homes or property if they
default on their loans."' Even those who finance health care
with unsecured debt may lose their assets, as an unsecured
creditor can garnish wages or levy assets after going through
the formal debt collection process."'
2. The Stress of Indebtedness
Anxiety is a health stressor associated with illness."'
estimating post-bankruptcy family pays on average $700 per month more than families
without adverse credit events for same transportation and housing due to higher
interest rates).
14 See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (5th ed. 2000); LoPUcKI & WARREN, supra note 100, at 29. Some
health care providers might even seek to secure debts with a lien on proceeds of a
personal injury lawsuit. See William F. Rohrbach, Rollover Hippocrates, WEST
VIRGINIA LAWYER, May 1996, at 8 ("If either the patient or attorney refuses to sign the
lien, the physician will threaten (and in many cases carry out such threat) to pursue
collection of the medical debt before the underlying personal injury litigation has been
resolved.").
15 See generally Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the
Common Pool Analogy As Applied to the Standard for Commencing a Case, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 337, 353-357 (1993) (providing overview of individual coercive collection
process).
116 WILLIAM R. LOVALLO, STRESS & HEALTH; BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
INTERACTIONS xii (1997); STAN V. KASL, Stress and Health Among the Elderly:
Overview of Issues, in STRESS & HEALTH AMONG THE ELDERLY 5-34 (May L. Wykle, Eva
Kahana & Jerome Kowal eds. 1992); Ann O'Leary, Shirley Brown & Mariana Suarez-
Al-Adam, Stress and Immune Function, in CLINICAL DISORDERS AND STRESSFUL LIFE
EVENTS 181 (Thomas W. Miller ed., 1997); Margaret Gatz, Stress, Control, and
Psychological Interventions, in STRESS & HEALTH AMONG THE ELDERLY, supra, at 209-
22; Steven C. Ames et al., A Prospective Study of the Impact of Stress on the Quality of
Life: An Investigation of Low Income Individuals with Hypertension, 23 ANNALS OF
BEHAV. MED. 112 (2001); Ichiro Kawachi et al., A Prospective Study of Anger and
Coronary Heart Disease: The Normative Aging Study, 94 CIRCULATION 2090 (1996);
James A. Blumenthal, Michael Babyak & Jiang Wei, Usefulness of Psychosocial
Treatment of Mental Stress-Induced Myocardial Ischemia in Men, 89 AM. J.
CARDIOLOGY 164, 167 (2002); MARTIN RYAN, SOCIAL WORK AND DEBT PROBLEMS 36
(1996); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE; A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT,
282-283 (1974); Patricia Drentea & Paul J. Lavrakas, Over the Limit: The Association
Among Health, Race and Debt, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 517 (2000); Richard J. Havlik, Alex
P. Vukasin & Stepha Ariyan, The Impact of Stress on the Clinical Presentation of
Melanoma, 90 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 57 (1992); Robert J. Genco, Alex
W. Ho, Sara G. Grossi, Robert G. Dunford & Lisa A. Tedesco, Relationship of Stress,
Distress, Disease, and Inadequate Coping Behaviors to Periodontal Disease, 70 J.
PERIODONTOLOGY 711 (1999). Even the popular press has been reporting on the
adverse effects of stress. See, e.g., Erica Goode, The Heavy Cost of Chronic Stress, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at F1 (listed as the most popular article by NYTimes.com readers
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Research from a variety of disciplines suggests a correlation
between indebtedness or financial trouble and a range of
health problems, including suicide."7 For some debtors, merely
owing unmanageable debt is stressful. Creditors' informal and
formal debt collection efforts also cause anxiety, although
creditors certainly have the legal right to engage in these
activities. Thus, using debt to get health care actually may
exacerbate illness or instigate other health problems,
particularly if the debtor-patient is concerned about getting
health care in the future, a difficulty discussed below.
3. Reduced Health Care and Health Maximizing Goods
and Services
The fact that providers often are their patients'
creditors has implications for the health care relationship. In
addition to engaging in debt collection attempts, providers of
medical goods and services might refuse to serve patients who
have not paid for prior services and have no current method of
payment."8 Concentrating care on paying patients may be part
of prudential financial management, but also has consequences
in the 24 hour period following its publication); David Tuller, Calculating the Benefits
of Managing Stress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at F7.
17 Richard Reading & Shirley Reynolds, Debt, Social Disadvantage, and
Maternal Depression, 53 SOC. SCI. & MED. 441, 443, 450 (2001); Drentea & Lavrakas,
supra note 116, at 518; DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE; A STUDY OF
DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 280-83 (1974); Havlik et al., supra note 116, at 59-60. See also
Genco et al., supra note 116, at 715-17. For non-U.S. studies considering the debt-
health correlation, see, for example, GILLIAN PARKER, GETTING AND SPENDING: CREDIT
AND DEBT IN BRITAIN (STUDIES IN CASH AND CARE) (1990); Siegfried Weyerer &
Andreas Wiedenmann, Economic Factors and the Rates of Suicide in Germany Between
1881 and 1989, 76 PSYCHOL. REP. 1331 (1995); ELAINE KEMPSON, ALEX BRYSON &
KAREN ROWLINGSON, HARD TIMES? How POOR FAMILIES MAKE ENDS MEET 261-95
(Policy Studies Institute 1994); Simon Hatcher, Debt and Deliberate Self-Poisoning,
164 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 111 (1994); Steven Hope, Chris Porer & Bryan Rodgers, Does
Financial Hardship Account for Elevated Psychological Distress in Lone Mothers?, 49
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1657 (1999); Hilary Graham, The Socio-economic Patterning of Health
and Smoking Behavior Among Mothers with Young Children on Income Support, 20
SOC. OF HEALTH & ILLNESSES 215 (1998). See also Press Release, Consumer Federation
of America, Credit Card Debt Imposes Huge Costs on Many College Students (June 8,
1999), at http://www.consumerfed.org/ccstudent.pdf (reporting on Robert Manning's
study on student credit card debt and statements of parents of deceased college
students).
18 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE, supra note
12, at 167, 174 (discussing possibility that "uninsured debtors may find it impossible to
get medical services unless they pay in cash"); Robert J. Blendon & Humphrey Taylor,
Views on Health Care: Public Opinion in Three Nations, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Spring 1989,
at 149, 156 (finding that about 7.5% of American respondents reported they had been
denied health care for financial reasons).
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for individuals who cannot pay and the health professionals
who wish to treat them."9 Using third-party credit could
temporarily extend the patient's access to health care, but in
the long term may lead to the same result.
Even if the provider remains willing to serve the
patient, patients with pre-existing debts to providers may be
reluctant to seek services. They may be embarrassed and fear
collection attempts,2 ' or may be concerned about incurring
more debt."' In the Open Society Institute study of individuals
using community clinics and resource centers, one in three
reported that being referred to a collection agency or owing
money for medical care negatively affected their future health-
seeking activity; they either would delay seeking medical care,
would not return to a prior medical provider, or may use only
emergency care for health needs.'22 This point applies not only
to medical services, but also to testing, drugs, and assistive
medical equipment.22 The 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
"9 See generally Charles J. Milligan, Jr., Provisions of Uncompensated Care in
American Hospitals: The Role of the Tax Code, The Federal Courts, Catholic Health
Care Facilities, and Local Governments in Defining the Problem of Access for the Poor,
31 CATH. L. 7, 24 (1987) (stating that increased financial pressure on non-profit
hospitals has led to decreased charity care).
120 Daly et al., supra note 13, at 42 (reporting that Access Project's
Community Access Monitoring Survey found 26% of the people "who owed money to a
health care facility said that the debt would deter them from seeking care in the
future").
M See, e.g., Ke Xu, David B. Evans, Kei Kawabata, Riadh Zeramdini, Jan
Klavus & Christopher J.L. Murray, Household Catastrophic Health Expenditure: A
Multicountry Analysis, 362 LANCET 111, 116 (2003) (discussing possibility that poor
households will forego care rather than become impoverished: "[m]aking the users of
health services pay out of pocket for the services they receive has a potential dual effect
at the population level - impoverishing some households that choose to seek services
and excluding others from seeking health care"); CAPLOVITZ, supra note 117, at 289
(noting that debt problems lead debtor to "so skimp on his budget that he neglects
health needs"); Brian Hickey, Food or Medicine? A Local Doctor Says It's Come to Just
That for Many of the Nation's Uninsured, PHILA. WKLY, Feb. 26, 2003; MacDonald,
supra note 102 (describing fear of seeking medical care due to bad debtor-creditor
experiences in the past); Second-Class Medicine, Consumer Reports Feature Report,
Sept. 2000, at 1, 10 (discussing deterrence effect on health seeking behavior of
incurring debt for health care).
122 OTOOLE, supra note 27; see also Skarbinski et al., supra note 26 (reporting
that, in survey of households containing sick person in Tbilisi, Georgia, 93% of
respondents said costs of health care were major deterrent to obtaining health care,
and 10% said cost of health care actually prevented their seeking it).
123 See, e.g., DeJong et al., supra note 109, at 278 (reviewing research
revealing that "financial barriers are the most common reason for not having needed
assistive equipment" and that large proportion of disabled did not have insurance
coverage for the equipment they needed, with many requests being denied by insurers).
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will offer further evidence of health related deprivations of
financially distressed households.' 4
IV. PROPOSALS TO REDUCE DEPENDENCY ON DEBT-BASED
HEALTH CARE FINANCE
A perfect solution to health care finance, whatever that
may be, has not emerged, and debt-based approaches are not
even a second-best solution. With that in mind, this Part
considers the benefits and drawbacks of several ways to reduce
dependency on debt and bankruptcy to finance health care.
They generally do not depend on changes to existing law, but
rather on adaptations to the current framework.
A. Debt, Bankruptcy, and Social Welfare Programs
Some of the studies discussed in this Article reveal
indebtedness by quite low-income individuals. Some indebted
or potentially indebted low-income people are eligible for, but
not enrolled in, state and federal health care programs
specifically tailored to their needs. 5  Even without an
expansion of eligibility requirements, a higher take-up rate of
health programs among eligible individuals might result in the
need for fewer debtor-creditor relationships and less debt. Such
programs provide care without requiring the patient to incur
excessive debt; indeed, assuming everyone follows the rules,
patients should not incur much or any debt, at least for the
direct costs of medical care. Researchers who study take-up
rates of health-related programs should investigate whether
those who file medical-related bankruptcy, or those who
finance significant health care expenses on credit without filing
for bankruptcy, either overlook or consciously reject currently
existing alternatives.
Health and related government programs do not
necessarily prevent serious financial distress and bankruptcy,
124 See supra note 25.
125 See generally supra note 73. See also Weissman et al., supra note 103, at
164 (reporting that enrollment of eligible low income hospital users who currently are
considered bad debt could "possibly improve access for patients and relieve their own
financial burden"). Some not enrolled have private insurance. Sherry Glied, Dahlia K.
Remler & Joshua Graff Zivin, Inside the Sausage Factory: Improving Estimates of the
Effects of Health Insurance Expansion Proposals, 80 MILBANK Q. 603, 618 (2002) (using
1999 Current Population Survey, estimating that 1.9 million children under 15 who
were income eligible for Medicaid held employer sponsored coverage and more than
600,000 held individually purchased insurance).
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however. Although the data are sparse, it appears that some
individuals file for bankruptcy even while enrolled in other
government programs. For example, Jonathan Fisher studied
some of the overlap to determine whether personal bankruptcy
and income transfer programs are substitutes. Using data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Fisher found that 37.7
percent of the bankruptcy filers in the sample received income
from unemployment insurance, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, supplemental security income, food
stamps, or a combination of these income transfer programs."'
This statistic does not address health benefit programs, but
Fisher also found no evidence that Medicaid benefits affect the
number of bankruptcy filings.17 The 2001 Consumer
Bankruptcy Project will shed additional light on the extent to
which bankruptcy filers are enrolled in government health
programs, further suggesting that these programs do not
entirely succeed in bankruptcy avoidance.'
In addition, as a practical matter, full take-up of health
programs by the eligible may be financially infeasible in the
current economic environment. States across the country are
already eliminating enrolled individuals from Medicaid or
reducing the available services."9 In this regard, health
programs may be victims of their own "success."
B. Prudent Financial Management and Greater
Information Gathering?
Although the financial planning practices of households
are poorly understood,'0  perhaps the highest income
26 JONATHAN D. FISHER, THE EFFECT OF TRANSFER PROGRAMS ON PERSONAL
BANKRUPTCY 3 (U.S. Department of Labor, Working Paper No. 346, Oct. 2001),
available at http://www.bls.gov/ore/pdf/ecO1O140.pdf. The PSID sample relevant to this
study pre-existed the replacement of AFDC with Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families. The PSID sample is supposed to be nationally representative, but seems to
have far too few bankruptcy filings. See id. at 14-15 (discussing low incidence of self-
reported bankruptcy in the PSID sample).
"' Id. at 17. Fisher does believe, however, that the generosity of
unemployment insurance can affect bankruptcy rates.
12m See supra note 25. As an example of state programs, Pennsylvania has
special programs for working disabled people and for disabled children. See generally
Pennsylvania Health Law Project, at http://www.phlp.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
1'9 See, e.g., Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Cutbacks Imperil Health Coverage for
States' Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at Al.
'30 See, e.g., ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL, MARTHA STARR-MCCLUER & ANNIKA E.
SUNDEN, SAVING AND FINANCIAL PLANNING: SOME FINDINGS FROM A FOCUS GROUP 3-4
(Federal Reserve, Working Paper, January 1996) (noting lack of research on saving,
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households both in and out of bankruptcy could make more
conservative financial choices ex ante to reduce the risk of
medical-related financial problems. The household's general
financial condition can influence the extent to which medical-
related expense precipitates financial disaster. Just as
economists suggest saving for post-retirement health care
needs,'3 ' perhaps in today's health care environment people
need to save for pre-retirement health care needs if they can
afford to do so. To plan appropriately, health plans and higher
income households need to take steps to ensure that insurance
beneficiaries understand the scope of their coverage. Because
medical problems also can reduce one's ability to work, high-
income households also should consider purchasing disability
insurance coverage, which is expensive but within reach for
this segment of the population.'32
Data from the 1999 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
reported in Part II modestly support this proposal because they
suggest that a substantial number of ill or injured debtors
struggle with other money management or debt problems that
perhaps could be avoided with better financial planning.
However, because the ill and injured identified these problems
at a slightly lower frequency than the non-ill, and because
these financial problems could be associated with the medical
problems themselves, one must be cautious in interpreting
these results.
and studying focus group of high income households, whose reasons for saving included
precautionary motives, although not uniformly), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1996/199601/199601pap.pdf.
131 PAUL FRONSTIN & DALLAS SALISBURY, RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS:
SAVINGS NEEDED TO FUND HEALTH CARE IN RETIREMENT (Employee Benefit Research
Institute, Issue Brief No. 254, Feb. 2003).
132 The U.S. Department of Commerce has estimated that 52.6 million
Americans have a disabling condition. See JACK McNEIL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, HOUSEHOLD
ECONOMIC STUDIES (Feb. 2001), available at httpJ/www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p70-
73.pdf. However, many falling within this category would not necessarily consider
themselves disabled. See DeJong et al., supra note 109. Many who apply for disability
benefits from the Social Security Administration are initially rejected, and the benefits
are quite modest in any event. See U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL
SECURITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME DISABILITY PROGRAMS: MANAGING
FOR TODAY, PLANNING FOR TOMORROW (Mar. 11, 1999) (on file with author). See
generally U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, FAST FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT
SOCIAL SECURITY (June 2003), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/
docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2003/ff2003.pdf. The 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
studies disability coverage among bankruptcy filers, and thus will shed additional light
on this issue.
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More generally, this proposal, like the low-income
household proposal, has multiple shortcomings. First, it will be
difficult to encourage higher-income households to reduce their
indebtedness given the many incentives for indebtedness, such
as the home mortgage interest deduction, and a limited savings
ethos.' A government truly committed to debt reduction could
reconsider and replace such policies with debt-neutral or debt-
antagonistic policies, but this has nominal political feasibility.
As a related matter, assuming no major changes to health care
finance and malpractice lawsuits are made, some medical
problems produce bills way too big for even prudent savers."
Furthermore, although understanding the scope of
insurance coverage is both admirable and important to good
financial planning, households may find this impossible to
accomplish given the structure of some benefit plans. To the
extent that coverage depends on a finding of medical necessity,
coverage is contingent on a discretionary determination made
around or after the time that a procedure or health aid is
needed. 3' Because this finding cannot be predicted reliably,
even higher-income families face barriers to planning for
protection against the use of debt and bankruptcy for health
care.
C. Those in the Middle
Uninsured and under-insured households may be too
"rich" for public health programs and too "poor" to save and
plan adequately for expensive medical emergencies, rendering
the foregoing proposals unhelpful. Following Dr. Hahnemann's
lead, medical providers could encourage advance payment with
133 See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A
Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 567 (2002) (describing government
encouragement of indebtedness); Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning up the Pigsty:
Approaching a Consensus on Exemption Laws, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275 (2000)
(commenting on government policy to encourage homeownership through mortgage
interest tax deductions and low cost federal loans). See also Stavins, supra note 9, at 20
(reporting based on 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances that "half of unknown
households could foresee major expenses in the next five to 10 years . but only 29%
stated that they were saving for those expenditures").
1 See generally Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the
Consumer Bankruptcy Decision, 54 J. FIN. 403, 413 (1999) (evaluating Survey of
Consumer Finance data and 1980 bankruptcy case data and finding that "[high
medical debt [in excess of 2% of income] has the greatest single impact of any
household condition variables in raising the conditional probability of bankruptcy").
135 See DeJong, supra note 109, at 274-75.
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the incentive of a substantial discount, '36 but this will not be
feasible in all instances.'37 Recent research by Professors
Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Tyagi suggests that the
households in the middle already have committed their
incomes to important fixed costs such as housing,
transportation, child care, education, and health insurance,
leaving little or no cushion for emergencies.' 3' For this group,
assuming all else remains the same, the question is not how to
avoid debt, but rather which type of debt is preferable. Without
significant and comprehensive alteration of the health care
finance system, the households in the middle are, and likely
will remain, caught between the commercial debtor-creditor
system and the pursuit of health.
V. CONCLUSION
Indebtedness is nothing new in America,'39 but it
deserves special attention when it stems from a visit to the
doctor, a lab test, prescription drugs, a hospital stay, medical
supplies, or home reconstruction to accommodate disabilities.
In the very short term, credit may enhance health access, just
like it enhances access to other goods and services, but in the
longer term, debt and bankruptcy have the potential to create
serious problems.
Some households may have the capacity to avoid health-
related indebtedness by seeking out fully covered care if they
fit the special categories of low income eligibility, or by buying
additional types of insurance and spending more conservatively
if they are high income. This Article suggests that pursuing
these courses of action might serve patients' and providers'
interests better than debt and bankruptcy, although such
proposals have limitations and other consequences. Even
assuming their viability for some, many households cannot
136 See Rundle, supra note 2 (reporting on medical clinics that operate on up-
front cash basis only).
137 See, e.g., Lefton, supra note 104, at 54 (reporting that at Temple East
Hospital, uninsured patients ineligible for charity care or unwilling to meet with a
financial counselor are offered a more reasonable rate (Medicare-plus-25%) if they
make up-front payment).
138 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 3.
139 See, e.g., BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE
OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002); LENDOL GLEN CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT (1999); PETER J. COLEMAN,
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND
BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900 (Beard Books 1999) (1974).
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follow either line of advice. Contemporary health policy
proposals that address post-retirement prescription drugs ° and
the totally uninsured4 ' will not close the pipeline between the
health care finance system and the debtor creditor system.
140 See, e.g., Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). The health care finance concerns of
the elderly are undoubtedly significant. Researchers recently estimated that one may
need as much as $1,458,000 - for health care needs alone - to retire at 65 in 2003 if
one has basic Medicare and no supplemental post-retirement health benefits.
FRONSTIN & SALISBURY, supra note 131. This figure does not even include long term
care, which costs approximately $50,000 or more per year. Relying on estimates from
the 1999 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Fronstin and Salisbury state that
Medicare covers only about 50% of health expenses. For data on a general increase in
bankruptcy filings among individuals 65 and older, see Sullivan, Thorne & Warren,
supra note 7.
1 See, e.g., John Kerry for President, Affordable Health Care for Every
American, at http:///www.johnkerry.com/issues/healthcare (proposing a plan to provide
health care to the 40 million uninsured Americans who have no coverage) (last visited
Feb. 5, 2004); Dean for America, Promoting American Health, at
http://www.deanforamerica.com/site/PageServer?pagename=policy statement-health#
(proposing methods to make insurance available and affordable) (last visited Feb. 5,
2004).
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